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ABSTRACT
Governments have been slow to address climate change. If non-governmental
agents share a responsibility in light of the slow pace of government action then
it is a collective responsibility. I examine three models of collective
responsi-bility, especially Iris Young’s social connection model, and assess
their value for identifying a collective, among all emitters, that can share
responsibility. These models can help us better understand both the growth
of the movement to divest from fossil fuels and the nature of responsibility
for collective action problems. Universities and colleges share a responsibility
because they occupy similar positions of, among other things, power and
privilege.
KEYWORDS
Climate change ethics, divestment, collective responsibility, Iris Young,
social connection responsibility, group agency

Confronting climate change requires wide-scale cooperation among many
agents. In other words, the responsibility is collective, a thought that is fairly
uncontroversial. Rather, the controversial question concerns who comprises
members of this collective. For instance, is it governments of the world or
individual greenhouse-gas emitters (Johnson 2003; Sinnott-Armstrong 2005;
Godoy 2017)? Is it those who have historically caused the most pollution or
those who can most easily afford to address the problem (Caney 2010)?
Regarding the first question, world emissions arise from the uncoordinated
activities of many in-dividuals, so it is understandable that governments are
called upon to address this and other problems stemming from collective
action. However, govern-ments have been slow or ineffective in
addressing climate change, in part because of disagreement over responses
to the second question. Some believe
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that responsibility falls on individuals and other group agents in light of this
shortcoming (Broome 2012; Cripps 2011; Hourdequin 2010; Jamieson 2007;
Nolt 2011; Raterman 2012; Schwenkenbecher 2014; Singer 2002). This might
entail protesting or speaking out against harmful policies, electing environmentally conscious leaders and so on. But if this is not working, or working too
slowly, then perhaps such agents have more direct duties. Many have already
taken on responsibilities themselves, often with the hope that their own actions
will encourage governments to act.1
For instance, since 2011 a growing number of institutions across the
world, especially colleges, universities and other higher-education institutions
(hereafter just ‘universities’), have questioned the ethical nature of investing
in fossil fuels. There is a growing movement to divest endowments of such
holdings. This is largely due to the efforts of 350.org, an international organisation of interconnected local chapters committed to various climate issues.
The Fossil Free campaign, as they call it, has been dubbed the fastest-growing
divestment movement in history (Vaughan 2015).2 By 2015, 28 universities
worldwide had already committed to divestment, adding to the list of cities,
counties, countries, religious institutions, foundations and other institutions
that have joined the movement.3 By the time of the twenty-first Conference of
the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
in Paris 2015 (or COP 21 for short), over US$3.4 trillion had been divested by
over 500 institutions (350.org 2016). The movement challenges the economic
structures that encourage environmentally harmful behaviour by calling attention to and questioning profits from fossil fuel investments. By divesting,
institutions hope to influence public opinion and garner political will to help
reduce the harmful impact of fossil fuel industries.
In what follows, I am interested in neither whether individual universities
have a responsibility to divest, nor whether divestment is the best strategy
among all possible strategies to thwart climate change. Rather, I am interested
in how the divestment movement illustrates a form of collective responsibility
that non-governmental agents can take up and share. Only collective action
will reduce global emissions. But in what sense can agents so broadly distributed across the world form a collective or group that is capable of acting
1.

2.
3.

In this article, I refer to two types of individual agents: an individual person and a single
group agent. A collection of agents may then refer to a collective of people, group agents
or some mixture of the two. For instance, all endowment-holding universities constitute a
collection of group agents. I also consistently use ‘group’ rather than ‘collective’ to refer to
an agent that is distinct from individual members.
This movement is modelled after that which helped bring an end to South African apartheid.
Other divestment movements exist or have existed. However, here I focus solely on the
Fossil Free campaign.
See the Fossil Free homepage: http://gofossilfree.org (accessed 11 Mar 2015). Norway is
the first country to pledge divestment from coal. While a number of institutions and even
individuals have divested, my focus here will be on universities.
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together? I discuss three methods in which philosophers understand collective
responsibility – what I refer to as the ‘group agent’, ‘obvious-and-reasonable’
and ‘social connection’ models.4 Respectively, individuals share responsibility,
first, when they are members of a group agent; second, when it is obvious to
a reasonable person that they ought to act collectively to effect a favourable
outcome; and third, in the same degree and proportion as their connection to
structures that produce harm. These are not competing methods, but mutually
reinforcing. Below, I discuss the ‘group agent’ and the ‘obvious-and-reasonable’ models. Both are helpful but face limitations on their own. Following on
from this, I focus on Iris Young’s ‘social connection’ model of responsibility
(Young 2011) to argue that agents share responsibilities when they occupy
similar social positions within an interconnecting and overlapping network of
agency; they meet them by acting with others who occupy similar social positions. Next, I use Young’s model to examine fossil fuel divestment. Because of
their shared social position, endowment-holding universities make up a collective that can together share responsibility to divest. In the final section, I offer a
conclusion that raises some questions about the nature of shared responsibility
and joint actions. Climate change challenges many of our traditional moral
concepts, such as responsibility. Applying these three models to the divestment
movement offers us a chance to rethink what it can mean to share responsibility for large problems of collective action.
FROM GROUP AGENTS TO RANDOM COLLECTIVES
When responsibility is collective, how do we identify members of that collective? In this section, I discuss two possible answers that are useful in the
context of climate change. The first is the ‘group agent’ model. According to
what Wringe calls the ‘agency principle’ (Wringe 2010), only agents can hold
collective responsibilities; likewise, the group agent model claims that only
group agents have collective responsibilities. By group agent, I mean a collection of agents that share a capacity for making decisions to act based on
shared desires and beliefs.5 This principle restricts responsibility to those col4.

5.

This survey is not meant to be exhaustive of all forms of collective responsibility, but to
address one of the major challenges we face when thinking about collective responsibility
in this context, namely, how the loosely connected collection of carbon emitters across the
world can share responsibilities. I discuss these three approaches in a different and far more
truncated form in Godoy (2017).
I take this definition from List and Pettit (2011: 19–41). However, there is a wide range of
literature regarding the constitution of group agents and collectives, and what responsibilities
may follow from such a constitution. For instance, List and Pettit align themselves closely
with, among others, French (1984), who describes the organized decision-making procedures
that qualify groups to hold responsibility (List and Pettit 2011: 11); Gilbert (2000) attempts to
define what constitutes a ‘plural subject’ relying on a particular account of shared intentions;
and May (1992) focuses on the role that shared desires or goals play in sharing responsibility.
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lectives that are organised enough to form distinct agents; many, but not all,
corporations and governing bodies do. However, there is an exception to the
agency principle that involves what List and Pettit refer to as ‘responsibilizing’
(List and Pettit 2011: 157, 193). If a company has not established, for instance,
rational procedures by which it makes decisions – one of the necessary conditions for group agency according to, among others, List and Pettit – the public
still ought to hold it responsible for any harm it causes since doing so will
encourage the company to develop those procedures. We punish and praise
children for similar reasons. In both instances, there is potential for agency
to develop, and this potential is grounds for holding the company or child
responsible.
Many believe that group agents, such as corporations, should be addressing
climate change, and indeed, many such agents have adopted environmentally
minded policies. However, there are limitations to thinking about collective
responsibility for climate change in terms of these types of agents. First, group
agents that presently exist may be slow to act or resistant to address climate
change since they were originally formed with a particular purpose in mind;
most likely, this purpose had nothing to do with climate change. For instance,
libraries are created to loan books and oil companies to profit from selling oil.
Neither was meant to confront a changing climate. Governments were formed
to address a wide range of issues and climate change is just one that they consider among many. Sometimes groups are slow to act because it takes time
to recognise, incorporate and prioritise new values in their decision-making
processes, or to develop or formalise such procedures if these values are new.
For decades now, governments have deliberated over how concerns about our
warming planet should influence their actions and policies. But sometimes
new values are not even compatible with those the group had in mind when it
was formed. (This is certainly true for any fossil fuel companies whose aim to
generate profits by selling fossil fuels is at odds with the health of the global
atmosphere.) In these cases, the public can apply external pressure – or, for
members, internal pressure – to encourage groups to reform their values or
act more quickly. Slow reaction time and resistance to change are not intrinsic
characteristics of group agents, but rather a fact about those currently in existence which might take up responsibility for climate change.
This leads to a second limitation. If group agents are the only way to think
about collective responsibility for climate change, then an individual member
frustrated by the sluggish pace of their group has little other recourse aside
from helping to expedite its action. A group agent meets its responsibilities by
taking group action, and only certain people within a group are authorised to
act on its behalf (List and Pettit 2011: 35–36). For instance, those who work
in human resources or in accounting at BP cannot apologise on behalf of the
company after an oil spill. Nor is it reasonable to think such employees should
don biohazard suits and clean up the spill themselves. When groups act slowly,
Environmental Values 26.6
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as they have with climate change, it is useful to have a model of collective
responsibility that allows for alternatives to group agents.
Finally, just as no one individual agent is capable of making a significant
environmental impact on their own, many group agents are incapable of making a significant impact on their own. Large corporations who are leaders
within their industry may be in a position to make changes that ripple through
to affect the policies of competitors and suppliers, but most group agents are
not large industry leaders (more on this below). Similarly, high-emitting countries such as the United States may be in a position to facilitate cooperation by
making changes to their emissions policies. However, making an impact on
climate change requires the cooperation of other states too. The group agent
approach alone is therefore too restrictive for defining collective responsibility
as only attributable to group agents. Many large group agents, such as governments, do not seem to be responding quickly enough to climate change.
Groups take time to adjust to new problems, formulate responses and convince
other groups to do likewise.
The second approach to collective responsibility is the ‘obvious-andreasonable’ approach. This begins with individuals rather than groups. I take
‘obvious-and-reasonable’ from Held, who argues that even random collectives
of people may be held responsible for transforming themselves into a group
capable of action, ‘when the action called for in a given situation is obvious to
the reasonable person and when the expected outcome of the action is clearly
favourable’ (Held 1970: 476, emphasis added). This collective can be, for instance, passers-by who encounter a person pinned under the heavy rubble of
a collapsed building. The passers-by can be held individually responsible for
failing to act together to lift the heavy rubble and save the trapped person
(ibid.: 479–480).6 It is obvious to the reasonable person that this would prevent a death, and clearly the favourable outcome is the survival of the trapped
person. In other words, the obvious-and-reasonable account does not require
group agency or its potential. This offers an advantage over the group agent
approach since it allows for more types of collectives, not just potential group
agents, to hold responsibilities, especially new collectives that assemble in response to a particular problem.
But does Held’s model violate the agency principle since it requires action
of a collective which is not yet an agent? Perhaps agency is not necessary for
responsibility. Wringe (2010) has recently challenged the agency principle outright by arguing that obligations can fall on the global collective of all human
beings even though they cannot constitute a group agent. He draws a distinction
6.

Held’s position is similar to that of May, who calls collectives with the potential to become
more organized agents ‘putative groups’ (May 1992: 105–122). Cripps also invokes May’s
putative groups in order to argue for what she calls ‘weak collective responsibility’ (Cripps
2011: 174–175), although she makes some distinctions between her position and May’s
regarding the distribution of responsibility among a putative group (ibid.: 177).
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between the subject (the ‘global collective’) and addressee (individual human
agents) of such obligations. According to Wringe, without a global group
agent, individuals would be the addressees of obligations to reduce emissions
and would have to ‘do things which are appropriately related to the carrying
out of the action whose performance would constitute fulfilment of the collective obligation’ (ibid.: 227). This sounds consistent with Held’s understanding
of the responsibility that befalls even a random collective. Schwenkenbecher
(2013) disagrees with Wringe since, although joint duties are possible among
collectives without agency, those collectives must be capable of joint action.
By acting jointly, she means people who act ‘because they believe that these
others will contribute their share toward the joint goal’ (ibid.: 313).7 Since all
humans on Earth cannot act jointly, they are not collectively responsible for
reducing emissions.
I agree with Schwenkenbecher, who reveals a shortcoming of the obvious-and-reasonable approach. While this approach works well for smaller
collectives such as passers-by or other strangers who happen to encounter
harm, problems arise when we use it to think about climate change or other issues that are global in scale. Bates raises a related concern with Held’s account
regarding larger collectives with complicated obligations (say, to overthrow a
corrupt government): ‘each individual would seem to be a member of a practically unlimited number of “random collections”, and it is at least unclear as to
which of these random collections is failing to [act]’ (Bates 1991: 104). The
random collection of emitters is similarly too large and loosely connected to
ever be a candidate for joint action, especially since it is not clear with whom
each individual should be acting or where the boundaries of collectives begin
and end. In other words, there is a practical problem of joint action when collectives get too big or too dispersed. But perhaps there is no reason to think of
all emitters as a single collective. In what follows, I show how social connection can identify a collection of emitters – among a vast global collective – who
can act together because they share similar social positions and responsibilities
that follow from those positions. Such collectives are not group agents, yet
they are capable of acting together to confront climate change.
SOCIAL CONNECTION RESPONSIBILITY AND CLIMATE CHANGE
Young (2011) offers a model of responsibility that is shared among those who
are socially connected to structural injustices. This form of harm arises from
seemingly innocent everyday routines. Traditional notions of responsibility single out individual agents that cause harm; yet structural injustices are
so causally complex that identifying individual offending agents does little
7.

Those familiar with Gilbert (1992) will see a similarity between her work and this definition
of joint action.
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to correct or prevent the harm they encourage from recurring. Young uses
the apparel industry’s reliance on sweatshop labour as an illustration (ibid.:
125–134).
Individual sweatshop managers who beat their employees, deny them
access to water or toilets, or commit similarly atrocious acts are themselves
guilty of causing harm. However, it would be missing something important
about the situation to stop at singling out such agents. There is a complex chain
of interdependent social processes that encourages and perpetuates the persistence of sweatshops. It spans from consumers to retail stores, to global apparel
companies, to their contracted manufacturers and supply chains. Authorities
may identify and remove abusive managers or close offending factories, but
the global demand for cheap clothing and high profits ensures that more will
spring up in their place. If host countries begin regulating labour practices in
such a way that increases labour costs, companies will likely relocate sweatshops to countries with weaker regulations.
In addition to blaming individually guilty agents, Young suggests that all
those socially connected to these processes – from consumers to labourers
– share responsibility to improve background conditions and structures that influence individual actions (ibid.: 95–122). Such responsibility can only be met
through collective action. People are socially connected by virtue of their common participation in interdependent social processes, or ‘mutually influencing
institutions and practices through which people enact their projects and seek
their happiness and … [through this participation] they affect the conditions
under which others act, often profoundly’ (ibid: 139). In other words, when
considering structural harm, we should begin with the assumption that responsibility emerges from how we already work together, quasi-intentionally, in
ways that give rise to patterns of behaviour by which we cooperate with one
another to achieve intertwined ends, rather than with the assumption that we
act in isolation, and that we are only responsible for the harm we individually
cause. In fact, our actions often have a strong influence on the actions of those
to whom we are socially connected.
There is a clear analogy between the network of processes enabling sweatshop labour and that enabling climate change. A single consumer can avoid
buying apparel produced under unjust conditions. The good intentions behind
this abstention may be morally admirable, but it leaves the structures reproducing the injustice intact. Similarly, a single philosopher who refuses to fly to a
conference in order to give a paper does little to prevent the harm associated
with climate change. Social connection responsibility is met by acting with
other agents to transform harmful structures rather than by acting as an isolated, individual agent.
This notion of responsibility is more open-ended than what we might call
duties, which outline specific actions one must take (ibid.: 143). Accordingly,
Young offers four parameters which act as guidelines when thinking through
Environmental Values 26.6
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possible ways to meet social connection responsibility: power, privilege, interest and collective ability (ibid. 144–147).8 Each of these is derived from the
relative positions that agents occupy within the interconnected framework of
social practices. Below I discuss how these parameters define narrower collections of agents among a much wider global collective that shares similar
responsibilities to combat climate change through joint action.
The first parameter is power. Some agents have more power than others to affect structures (ibid.: 144). Responsibility is often considered to be
commensurate with power (Jonas 1984: x). I cannot have a responsibility to
single-handedly bring an end to fossil fuel extraction since it is beyond my
power to do so.9 Power to affect the climate varies according to one’s position
within the network of social structures that encourage fossil fuel use; the nature
of one’s moral responsibility varies accordingly. Such power is understood as
relative to other positions within this network of agents. Governments, businesses and individuals all have different power to influence social structures.
Different individuals have different powers depending on whether they are oil
company executives or middle-class commuters.
Likewise, when a leading company demands that its supply chains adopt
new manufacturing standards, the effect often ripples through the entire industry. Many manufacturers and suppliers work with multiple corporations. Apple
shares factories with Samsung, McDonald’s shares suppliers with Burger King
and so on. A ripple effect was anticipated, for instance, when McDonald’s
announced plans to curb its use of chicken treated with antibiotics, since
those who raise chicken for McDonald’s also supply many other companies
(Kesmodel et al. 2015). One such supplier is Tyson, the largest meatpacker in
the United States. According to the social connection model, such leaders have
different responsibilities from smaller businesses, which correspond to their
differences in power.
An individual agent, by contrast, has very little power to curb the world’s
carbon emissions. A lone joyrider enthusiast’s decision to go for a drive on a
sunny Sunday afternoon will ultimately have a negligible effect on the atmospheric concentration of carbon; while governments can pass laws to increase
fuel-efficiency standards, corporations can create more fuel-efficient cars and
so on (Johnson 2003; Sinnott-Armstrong 2005). If individuals wish to effect
change, they must put pressure on agents who do have power to influence
social processes. In order for this pressure to be effective, individuals must act
8.

9.

I focus on the four parameters that Young discusses, but perhaps there are others. For
instance, Cripps (2013) discusses three types of collectives – ‘The Young’, ‘The Able’ and
‘Polluters’ – that share some collective responsibilities. Although she does not discuss these
groupings in terms of Young’s four parameters, there is clear overlap. I do not here have the
space to discuss whether Cripps suggests any additional parameters by which to locate shared
responsibilities.
In other words, ought implies can, though Jonas believes modern technology requires us to
modify this Kantian dictate (Jonas 1984: 128–129).
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with each other. When agents act together – say by joining a movement – they
increase their power and can more effectively encourage leaders to construct
new laws, persuade companies to abandon carbon-heavy practices and so on.
The same is true of individual states or corporations. Avoiding further serious
global warming requires wide-scale cooperation among many agents. States
can use their powers to convince other states to adopt laws or sign international
treaties to limit emissions.
This means that, according to the social connection model, individuals are
responsible not only for the power they presently have, but also for the power
gained from acting with other agents. Agents who occupy similar positions of
power in relation to a form of structural injustice will have similar responsibilities, since the limits to effect change are relative to one’s power. Power is
therefore one guideline that can help define a collective of agents who share
responsibility. Governments can use their powers to work with other governments, companies with other companies and individuals with individuals.10
The second parameter is privilege. One might assume that privilege is a
derivative of power, and indeed they are often connected. However, power
refers to the ability to influence structures, while privilege refers to the benefits
gained from one’s position relative to others within a social network (Young
2011: 145). Social-structural processes give rise to positions of relative privilege or disadvantage. Young cites as an example of such privilege the low
prices and large selections of apparel that Western consumers enjoy, which
is itself a by-product of sweatshop labour (ibid.: 145). The institutions and
processes that give rise to climate change create similar positions. The world’s
affluent citizens consume fossil fuels at relatively low prices since many of the
environmental costs are excluded from what they pay. While many are vulnerable to the effects of climate change, the world’s poor are particularly so, and
face additional burdens (IPCC 2014: 31; Mearns and Norton 2010: 18–23).
The affluent are more likely to escape dangerous storms, have access to food
during droughts and live in states that build infrastructure to mitigate the effects of climate change.
The world’s affluent are also able to reduce some emissions with relative
ease: by installing solar panels, driving greener vehicles, buying organic produce, reducing the meat and dairy in their diet and so on. But doing so prevents
relatively little harm. Social connection responsibility is met not by making
changes to one’s own lifestyle, but by acting with others to transform structures
that encourage the individual lifestyle choices that lead to harm. Those who
10. I mention a horizontal rather than vertical sharing of responsibilities since I believe it is
easier for agents of equal power to share responsibilities. Though there may be other reasons
for individuals to share responsibilities with corporations, rich nations with poor nations,
and so on. However, the manner in which agents from vastly different positions can share
responsibilities with one another will become far more difficult to assess. Indeed, this was one
of the difficulties with the obvious-and-reasonable approach. Thanks to Maeve McKeown for
helping me refine this point.
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occupy similar positions of privilege constitute a collective, the members of
which share responsibility for understanding their privilege and finding a productive way of ensuring others are not harmed by it. It is difficult to raise moral
questions about one’s own privilege. Those who do so are especially vulnerable to arguments that justify their advantages. Gardiner calls this temptation
‘moral corruption’ (Gardiner 2011: 45–48). Those with similar privileges share
a responsibility to refute these arguments and resist such corruption.11
In other words, the global affluent must keep in mind their interest, the
third parameter, in confronting climate change. Those who benefit from privilege often have an interest in maintaining it. Likewise, those who suffer greatly
from injustice have a particular interest in confronting it, one that is quite different from that of those who feel its effects more mildly (Young 2011: 145).
Workers who are actually employed by sweatshops and communities who
stand to lose their homes due to sea level rise are in better positions to understand the realities of this harm than those who consider them from a safe
distance. Becoming a victim of harm does not require one to forfeit agency,
although vulnerability conditions responsibility. Those in similar positions are
more likely to share similar desires, and those who share desires for common
ends are more likely to act together to achieve those ends.12 This is important for social connection responsibility, which requires people to act together.
Keeping interest in mind also guards against paternalistic attitudes that those
in powerful or privileged positions are wont to take – that is, by taking responsibility for those suffering rather than taking up responsibility with them.
Often the powerless become victims of power or the powerful, who shape
structures to the benefit or privilege of some over others. Meeting social connection responsibility should not take the form of trying to merely wash one’s
hands of guilt, but instead of examining one’s interest in an injustice. This
involves questioning one’s power and privileges, and by engaging in dialogue
with those who have different stakes – for instance, those who have a direct
interest in guarding themselves against actual harm.
The final parameter is collective ability, which in the context of our discussion refers to the ability to act as, or like, a group agent. It is with this
parameter that we see most clearly how the social connection model is an addition to the prior two models. A collection of agents that is already capable
of acting together (broadly construed) has a different responsibility from those
that do not (ibid.: 147). Universities, for instance, played a big role in the antisweatshop movement. (In the next section I will discuss how these institutions
11. The ‘perfect moral storm’ of climate change makes us especially vulnerable to an instance
of corruption that Gardiner refers to as ‘intergenerational buck-passing’ – when present
generations refuse to act for the sake of future generations. Here I use the term in the wider
sense of agents subverting moral language and arguments for their own purposes (Gardiner
2011: 46).
12. We might say that this creates greater solidarity, which according to some is a prerequisite for
acting together. See e.g. Feinberg (1968).

Environmental Values 26.6

11

SHARING RESPONSIBILITY FOR DIVESTING FROM FOSSIL FUELS

have once again taken the front line, this time in the movement to counteract
climate change.) Students and faculty pressured administrators to adopt stricter
labour standards for manufacturers of their team uniforms and other clothing
sold on campus, thereby effecting changes in the apparel industry (ibid.: 147).
Universities often have governance structures that are more democratic than
those typically found in the corporate world. Students, faculty and staff often
have a say in decision-making. Neighbourhoods, streets and even apartment
buildings are also collectives that can more easily develop mechanisms facilitating joint action under the right circumstances. Variance in these mechanisms
or their possibility entails different responsibilities.
Recall that the problem identified above was the practical difficulties of locating a collective among all emitters who share responsibilities to act together.
The social connection model and Young’s four parameters are useful for identifying agents who occupy similar positions relative to the injustices resulting
from climate change; they narrow down the scope of what could otherwise be
a limitless number of random collectives or a nebulous ‘global collective’ of all
moral agents on the planet. Socially connected agents then take up responsibility by acting together with the aim of transforming the structures perpetuating
climate change; since no individual agent has the power to do this alone, joint
action is important. Yet in acting together, socially connected agents need not
transform themselves into a group agent, though doing so may certainly help
to achieve common ends more effectively.
I now turn to the fossil fuel divestment movement for an example of social connection responsibility in practice. The divestment movement and its
proponents encourage universities to divest, in part, by highlighting the relative social position that endowment-holding institutions occupy. No divesting
organisation will effect climate change measurably on its own, but by acting
together, universities put pressure on the political and economic structures encouraging carbon emissions. Currently, a number of universities have joined
the divestment movement, although by doing so, they are not becoming part
of a formal group agent.
THE DIVESTMENT MOVEMENT AND ENDOWMENT-HOLDING
UNIVERSITIES
An organisation ‘joins’ the Fossil Free movement by divesting. But in doing
so, it does not become part of a larger group agent; in fact, it is meaningful that
they do not. When distinct agents join the movement for their own, sometimes
different, reasons, they send a more powerful political message than that which
would come from an individual. I believe that the growth of this movement has
been encouraged, implicitly, by a social connection model of responsibility.
Universities are pressured to join because they belong to a collection of agents
Environmental Values 26.6
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that benefit financially from fossil fuels and that have the ability, collectively,
to exert pressure for change. Young’s four parameters are again useful to elucidate why responsibility has here taken the form it has.
First, universities have limited power to affect the structures that encourage
climate change. They cannot change laws or write public policy, as can governments, though they can teach courses and fund research to help influence
public opinion. While not all universities have this kind of clout, many have
endowments, and each school possesses the power to divest its own endowment of fossil fuels. Plans to divest, considered individually, are not likely to
slow climate change to a measureable degree – as is the case for a single person
who refuses to fly or drive. Analysts have pointed out that it is unlikely that
even the entire movement will hurt the profits of fossil fuel companies. But advocates claim the movement’s power lies in its political, rather than financial,
effects. Divesting expresses disapproval for obtaining benefits at the cost of
perpetuating great harm on present and future generations.13
Because each agent that joins the movement increases the strength of this
message, those universities that might influence others by divesting have faced
stronger pressure – not unlike industry leaders in the corporate world. Sit-ins
and other forms of protest at top universities such as Harvard and Yale have
been well-covered by journalists, bloggers and tweeters.14 When Harvard’s
president Drew Faust published the university’s reasons against divestment,
it was the subject of heavy public scrutiny. For instance, Harvard and others
have suggested that institutions retain more power by holding on to investments in fossil fuels since doing so gives them a seat at the company table as
a shareholder (Faust 2015). However, it is not clear how shareholder action
could be effective since the business model of such companies is so deeply
dependent upon fossil fuels. A strong enough contingent of concerned shareholders may encourage companies to shift some attention to renewables, but
a third of global oil reserves, half of gas reserves and over 80 per cent of coal
reserves should remain unused in order to meet a warming limit of 2 degrees
Celsius (McGlade and Ekins 2015). It is unlikely that concerned voices can
surpass those that are merely interested in maximising profits while they still
can through the tried and tested business model of extracting fossil fuels.15 As
agents who share the power to divest, universities can share responsibility to
collectively put pressure on those structures enabling climate change. Their
13. For more on the communicative value of individuals acting unilaterally to fight climate
change, see Hourdequin (2011).
14. See the Divest Harvard homepage: http://divestharvard.com/ (accessed 4 Jul 2015).
15. It is possible that with enough momentum, shareholder activism can illustrate an effective
form of social connection responsibility (thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this thought).
My point is simply that past efforts seem to have demonstrated that building this momentum
is unlikely. However, recent attempts by shareholders have been more successful than in the
past (McKenna 2016).
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social position, in the context of a growing movement of divesting universities,
amplifies the meaning of this act.
Second, universities share a privilege that they can easily give up in order
to provoke change. Profits from fossil fuels finance a portion of their operating
costs through endowments, while they are insulated from the worst environmental costs of these investments. The divestment movement challenges, in
a very public way, the moral status of benefits reaped from fossil fuels. This
challenge finds a basis in the principle: One ought to surrender a privilege that
is linked to harm if one can do so without incurring a great cost. This is a version of a well-cited principle in moral philosophy regarding harm prevention.
The moral choices we make often come with sacrifices, but some sacrifices
are worth the cost; for instance, saving a drowning child is generally regarded
as worth the cost of getting one’s clothes wet.16 Analysts have determined that
divestment will not significantly harm operating budgets, and that in some
instances portfolios devoid of fossil fuels even outperformed those with them
(Zeller 2015). As more universities decide to divest, it becomes increasingly
difficult to argue that these investments are necessary for effective functioning.
Universities challenge their own privileged positions by publicly relinquishing
their financial ties to fossil fuels; they send a powerful political message by
doing so.
Third, universities share a special interest in the good of their communities
and the future well-being of their members. Promoting this well-being is the
aim of the divestment movement. The social role of a university is, in part, to
educate and to advance knowledge, goals that are inherently future oriented
and melioristic. University missions often refer to educating the future leaders of society. We can find similar principles reflected in religious institutions
and philanthropic foundations, both of which have also joined the divestment
movement in notable numbers.17 An institution publicly pledged to some good
sends a different message by divesting than would, say, a for-profit corporation. Even when non-profit institutions divest for financial reasons, there is a
moral dimension to their act since everything they do is evaluated in light of
their mission and the role that non-profit institutions play in society. The divestment movement has leveraged this interest to increase the impact of each
university that announces plans to divest.
Look once more at the remarks by Harvard’s president, Drew Faust. He
argued that an endowment is an educational resource that should be used
solely to advance the institution’s ability to educate. He writes: ‘[w]e should
16. Perhaps the most frequently cited example of this principle comes from Singer (1972). He
formulates the principle as follows: ‘If it is in our moral power to prevent something bad
from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we
ought, morally, to do it’ (ibid.: 231).
17. The Rockefeller Brothers Fund made headlines when it announced plans to rid their US$860
million philanthropic fund of fossil fuel investments, most notably since the history of the
family’s wealth is intimately linked to the oil industry (Schwartz 2014).
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… be very wary of steps intended to instrumentalize our endowment in ways
that would appear to position the University as a political actor rather than an
academic institution’ (Faust 2015). The problem with this reasoning is that
refusing to divest also sends a political message; the divestment movement has
politicised holding such endowments in the first place. If Harvard continues to
maintain the largest endowment in the United States, and if it continues to benefit from fossil fuel investments despite scientific evidence that there are more
fuels in reserve than can be safely burned, then it will be forced to reconcile
this choice with the purported interests it has in the future of its students and in
improving the world through education.
In contrast, the University of Edinburgh released a statement against
divestment in May 2015 only to retract and revise it later that month by announcing plans to begin a partial divestment of its shares in the three biggest
fossil fuel producers, or ‘only where feasible alternative sources of energy
exist, and where companies do not invest in low-carbon technologies’ (Brooks
2015; Jeffery 2015). The reversal followed a ten-day student occupation of
the school’s finance department. The university’s original stance involved
claiming that it considered the interest of developing countries which lacked
‘feasible alternatives to fossil fuels that can ensure power for basic needs, such
as heating, clean water and refrigeration’; they called divestment an ‘easy privilege of the developed world’ (Jeffery 2015) – a misdirected attempt at taking
responsibility for rather than with those suffering. However, developing countries are those most vulnerable to climate change, and thereby also have an
interest in cutting global carbon emissions. The political act of divesting does
not harm the developing world’s actual energy supply – recall the criticism of
the movement’s efficacy that pointed out how profits from fossil fuels will remain unaffected. Rather, divestment sends a political message to government
leaders about the dangers of continuing to ignore the true costs of carbon to
present and future generations.
Finally, it is clear that universities already possess collective ability; that
is, they already function as a group agent, often with highly democratic deliberative processes. On university campuses, the move to divest is mostly
spearheaded by students and faculty. Both frequently have access to organised
governance structures used to make collective decisions and liaise with other
parts of the community. Shared governance makes it easier for universities to
join the divestment movement. Each institution that considers divestment does
so with the knowledge that other universities are likely to have similar deliberations within their communities, and that they are likely to consider similar
reasons for joining the movement, though no substantial structures are in place
for universities to deliberate with one another about divestment. Divesting
does not imply that everyone should abandon fossil fuel use; it only implies
that it is wrong for universities to continue to benefit from this privilege while
others suffer. Each university divests as an individual agent, but does so as
Environmental Values 26.6
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part of a movement of agents that have similar powers over endowments from
which they derive morally suspect privileges against their future interests.
CONCLUSION
My claim has been that the social connection model is a useful way to identify
agents, among all carbon emitters, that can share responsibility in combatting climate change by acting together. Doing so does not form a new group
agent, but those who are socially connected can more easily act towards a common aim because they share power, privilege, interest and collective abilities.
This is not true of the vast global collective of emitters. Both the group agent
and obvious-and-reasonable approaches capture many of our moral intuitions
about collective responsibility. Universities are often group agents, and as such
they have responsibilities to address climate change when governments are
acting too slowly. In fact, it should be obvious to the reasonable person that
all emitters share some responsibilities, but it is unclear how these responsibilities are fulfilled – how, for instance, all emitters can act together to meet a
shared responsibility. The four parameters of the social connection model offer
a way to imagine how this responsibility can be shared. They provide a map for
agents that share similar positions and that can take similar actions to achieve
collective aims.
My focus has been on comparing different frameworks of collective responsibility, which has left me room only to hint at some of the interesting
metaphysical and linguistic questions they raise about the nature and meaning
of shared responsibility, joint intentions and collective agency. Others have
written on these topics and I have referred to many of these discussions above.
These questions are important and hotly debated. However, metaphysics and
language need not always ‘trump moral arguments’ so long as there ‘good
moral reasons’ to think about collective responsibility (Held 2011: 159–160).
Universities have good moral reasons to take up responsibilities by divesting,
especially in light of the slow government responses to global climate change,
and the fact is that many are doing so. My task has been to better understand
why this is so by elucidating the shape of the responsibility, not its necessary content or its metaphysical assumptions – that is, not whether divesting is
the best way to meet collective responsibility or whether this responsibility is
properly understood as individual, collective or shared.18
I have also not discussed how social connection responsibility might operate
in the absence of a growing social movement. By focusing on divestment, perhaps I have selected a case in which it is easy to discern shared responsibilities.
18. For additional discussions of the differences between individual, collective and shared
responsibility, see Clowney (2014), Cripps (2011), May (1992), Schwenkenbecher (2013)
and Young (2011).
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If so, I hope to have provided a clue for spotting social connection in less obvious cases. Problems as vast in scale as climate change require many agents,
collective and individual, to work together. Because of their vast scale, many
are connected to these problems; they are just not connected in the same way.
Young’s model provides a method for dividing up the global collective into
more manageable pieces so that, in the absence of a robust movement, it is
more clear with whom we should be acting to create one.
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